

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 IO-10 ISO-00 CU-02 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-03 H-02

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R 251504Z APR 75

FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9649

INFO AMEMBSSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION USBERLIN

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

USMISSION GENEVA

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

AMCONSUL LENINGRAD

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMCONSUL MUNICH

USMISSION NATO

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 MOSCOW 5822

GENEVA FOR USDEL CSCE

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E.O. 11652 GDS  
TAGS: PFOR, CSCE, UR  
SUBJ: SOVIET POLICY AFTER CSCE

REF: MOSCOW 5616

1. SUMMARY: AS A CONTRIBUTION TO THE GATHERING DEBATE ON SOVIET POST-CSCE POLICY, THE EMBASSY OFFERS THE FOLLOWING SPECULATIVE ANALYSIS OF WHAT ACTIONS WE EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO TAKE. WE WELCOME COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT AND INTERESTED INFO ADDRESSEES. OUR ANALYSIS ASSUMES THAT CONDITIONS IN GENEVA -- AND IN PORTUGAL -- WILL PERMIT A CSCE SUMMER SUMMIT, BUT WE ALSO DISCUSS THE POSSIBILITY OF A DELAYED OR ABORTED CONCLUSION. IN GROSS, WE EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO USE THE CSCE SUMMIT AS A SPRINGBOARD FOR ADVERTISING THE TRIUMPHS OF THEIR DETENTE POLICY, FOR DEVOTING NEW EMPHASIS TO ARMS CONTROL (INCLUDING SALT AND MBFR, BUT ALSO INCLUDING A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE AND OTHER UNHELPFUL INITIATIVES), FOR CONVENING A EUROPEAN COMMUNIST CONFERENCE, FOR INCREASING THEIR PRESENCE IN WESTER EUROPE, AND FOR PRESSING THEIR IDEA OF AN ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY SYSTEM. WHILE IN THE LONG RUN BASKET THREE IS A CLEAR, IF MODEST, ASSET FOR THE WEST, WE SUSPECT THAT ONE IMMEDIATE RESULT OF THE HELSINKI SUMMIT WILL BE AN IDEOLOGICAL TIGHTENING UP IN EASTERN EUROPE AND IN THE SOVIET UNION. IN TERMS OF THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP, A CSCE SUMMIT WILL BE VIEWED AS A MAJOR PLUS FOR BREZHNEV AND HIS POLICIES. FROM A WESTERN POINT OF VIEW, THE ENDING OF CSCE WILL REMOVE AN ELEMENT OF WESTERN LEVERAGE ON SOVIET BEHAVIOR. WE THINK -- BUT WE ARE NOT WHOLLY CONFIDENT -- THAT THERE ARE ENOUGH ADDITIONAL MODERATING FACTORS TO KEEP THE SOVIETS AFTER HELSINKI FROM A QUALITATIVE INCREASE IN THEIR EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT WESTERN WEAKNESSES. IN ANY CASE--SHORT OF A RAPID PORTUGUESE COLLAPSE INTO COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIP, WHICH WE ASSUME WOULD MADE A CSCE THIRD STAGE ACADEMIC ANYWAY--WE DO NOT THINK THE WEST WOULD GAIN BY DELAYING A CSCE CONCLUSION, SINCE WESTERN LEVERAGE

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WOULD SOON REACH A POINT OF DIMINISHING RETURNS. IT SEEMS LIKELY THAT, AT THE HELSINKI FINALE, THE WEST WILL COME OUT WITH MORE, AND THE SOVIETS LESS, THAN EITHER SIDE EXPECTED WHEN THE WARSAW PACT LEADERS RENEWED THEIR CALL FOR A CONFERENCE IN 1969. BUT, WHILE THE SOVIETS WILL MAKE MORE OF IT, CSCE SHOULD BE A PLUS FOR BOTH SIDES AND A FURTHER STEP TOWARD CONSOLIDATING A SOVIET DETENTE POLICY, IMPORTANT ELEMENTS OF WHICH REMAIN IN THE OVERALL U.S. AND WESTERN INTEREST. END SUMMARY.

2. SOVIET USE OF CSCE ITSELF. THE SOVIETS CAN BE EXPECTED TO SEIZE ON THE COINCIDENCE OF A CSCE SUMMIT WITH THE 30TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE END OF WORLD WAR II TO PROCLAIM FINAL CONFIRMATION OF THE POST-WAR SETTLEMENT, WHICH SAW THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THEIR CONTROL OVER EASTERN EUROPE. BASKET THREE, PLUS THEIR POSITION IN BERLIN AND THE GDR, SHOULD STOP THEM SHORT OF EQUATING THE FINAL CSCE INSTRUMENTS WITH A PEACE TREATY, AND THIS WOULD BE ESPECIALLY TRUE IF THEY ARE COMPELLED TO SIGN A SINGLE FINAL DOCUMENT WHICH PUTS BASKET THREE ON A PAR WITH THE TEN PRINCIPLES. BUT THEY WILL TREAT SOME ELEMENTS OF THE PRINCIPLES-- IN PARTICULAR TERRITORIAL INVIOABILITY, WHICH FOR THEM LARGELY MEANS POLITICAL CONTROL OF EASTERN EUROPE -- AS IF THEY HAD THE FORCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW. THE SOVIETS WILL ALSO SEEK TO USE CSCE AS LEGITIMIZING A GREATER SOVIET PRESENCE IN WESTERN EUROPE, THROUGH TRADE UNION ORGANIZATIONS, FRONT GROUPS, AND TIES WITH THE EUROPEAN LEFT, AS WELL AS THROUGH GOVERNMENT-TO-GOVERNMENT CONTACTS. EQUALLY IMPORTANT, THEY WILL USE THE CSCE SUMMIT TO ADVERTISE THE SUCCESS OF THEIR DETENTE POLICIES TO AUDIENCES IN THE USSR ITSELF, IN THE WEST, AND IN THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT.

3. INSTITUTIONAL FOLLOW-UP. THE SOVIET PROBABLY HAVE ULTIMATELY IN MIND ANOTHER LARGE-SCALE, HIGH-LEVEL EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE. IN THE MEANTIME, AS MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN (NUMBER 4) SAID, THEY INTEND TO INUNDATE EUROPE WITH "A SERIES OF CONFERENCES, MEETINGS, AND MULTILATERAL CONSULTATIONS." HOWEVER, BECAUSE OF THE STING IN THE TAIL OF BASKET THREE OBLIGATIONS, MOSCOW IS LIKELY TO FIGHT SHY OF ANY CSCE CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE WHICH WOULD BE STRONG ENOUGH TO MONITOR THE RESPONSIBILITIES ASSUMED BY THE SIGNATORIES.

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4. BASKET THREE AND A TIGHTENING WITHIN THE BLOC. BASKET THREE SHOULD HAVE BOTH ACTIVE AND PASSIVE SPECIFIC BENEFITS FOR THE WEST, FOR EXAMPLE IN MAKING IT HARDER FOR THE SOVIETS TO REINTRODUCE RADIO JAMMING, IN SECURING MULTIPLE ENTRY/EXIT VISAS FOR JOURNALISTS, AND (MORE PROBLEMATICALLY) IN FACILITATING MARRIAGES AND FAMILY REUNIFICATION. MOREOVER, EVEN THOUGH BASKET THREE WILL BE ONLY A SMALL PIECE IN THE LARGE MOSAIC OF EAST-WEST CONTACTS, THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF THE CSCE OBLIGATIONS SHOULD HELP TO DIMINISH SOVIET NERVOUSNESS ABOUT THOSE CONTACTS. HOWEVER, IN THE NEAR TERM WE EXPECT LITTLE POSITIVE EFFECT FROM BASKET THREE IN THE AREA OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SOVIET UNION. AND SOVIET HARD-LINERS ARE LIKELY TO SEIZE ON THE CSCE

LANGUAGE ON CONTACTS TO STEP UP DOMESTIC IDEOLOGICAL  
EFFORTS. IN EEASTERN EUROPE THE COMPLETION OF  
CSCE IS LIKELY TO INTENSIFY AND ALREADY APPARENT  
SOVIET-INSPIRED IDEOLOGICAL VIGILANCE CAMPAIGN DESIGNED  
TO WARD OFF THE DESTABILIZING CONSEQUENCES OF THE  
OBLIGATIONS ON CONTACTS. IN SUM, THE COMPLETION OF A  
BASKET THREE DOCUMENT IS NOT LIKELY IN THE SHORT  
RUN TO CAUSE MUCH, IF ANY, NET IMPROVEMENT WITHIN THE  
BLOC. AS V. SHAPOSHNIKOV, A DEPUTY TO CPSU SECRETARY  
PONOMAREV IN THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE'S INTERNATIONAL

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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AMEMBASSY SOFIA  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA  
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SECTION, WROTE IN PRAVDA APRIL 19, THE POST-CSCE PERIOD WILL REQUIRE MORE RATHER THAN LESS "POLITICAL VISION AND VIGILANCE."

5. MILITARY DETENTE: WHAT WILL THEY DO FOR AN ENCORE? SINCE THE SOVIET THREAT CSCE AS THE CAPSTONE OF THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL DETENTE, ITS IMPENDING CONCLUSION WILL REQUIRE ANOTHER MAJOR THEME TO PRESERVE THE MOMENTUM AND EMPHASIZE THE INFINITE VARIETY OF THEIR PEACE POLICY. WITHOUT ANY DOUBT THE NEW THEME WILL BE MILITARY DETENTE, WHICH SOVIET LEADERS ARE NOW ROUTINELY CALLING THE APPROPRIATE FOLLOW-UP TO POLITICAL DETENTE. WE EXPECT GRANDSTAND PLAYS TO GET A WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE GOING; PERHAPS TO REINVIGORATE SUCH STAND-BYS AS NUCLEAR-FREE ZONES, SEAS OF PEACE, ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION, AND MILITARY BUDGET REDUCTION; AND POSSIBLY ALSO TO DEVELOP NEW PROPOSALS (E.G., ON NAVAL ARMS LIMITATION). MORE SOLIDLY, THE COMPLETION OF CSCE SHOULD RAISE THE SOVIET STAKE IN MBFR AND INCREASE THEIR EMPHASIS ON SALT (THOUGH IN SALT WE WOULD EXPECT NO APPRECIABLE INCREASE IN U.S. NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE).

6. FOCUS ON THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST CONFERENCE. CSCE GIVES THE SOVIETS A LAUNCH-PAD FOR SUMMONING THE EUROPEAN PARTY LEADERS, SINCE IT COMPLETES AND CONFIRMS THE PROGRAM OF THE LAST EUROPEAN CONFERENCE JUST EIGHT YEARS AGO: INVIOABILITY OF FRONTIERS, RECOGNITION OF THE TWO GERMAN STATES, RENUNCIATION OF THE USE OF FORCE, AND OF COURSE ACHIEVEMENT OF A EUROPEAN SECURITY CONFERENCE ITSELF. THE SOVIETS WILL HOPE TO CAPITALIZE ON MOMENTUM FROM THE CSCE SUMMIT TO GET AN EARLY CONVENING OF THE EAST BERLIN MEETING; TO HAVE THE CORRECTNESS OF THEIR PRESCRIPTIONS FOR EUROPE PROCLAIMED AT IT; TO TRY TO PRESS THEIR HEGEMONIAL IDEAS ON THE ROMANIANS, THE YUGOSLAVS, AND THE RECALCITRANTS IN

WESTERN EUROPE; AND TO CLEAR THE PATH TO A WORLD  
CONFERENCE.

7. NEXT STOP ASIA: COLLECTIVE SECURITY HITS THE ROAD.  
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THE SOVIETS HAVE ALREADY DRAWN ON THE EUROPEAN PARALLEL  
IN ASSERTING THE DESIRABILITY OF AN ASIAN SECURITY SYSTEM.  
THEY WILL HOPE TO JUICE UP THE PROSPECTS FOR AN  
ASIAN CONFERENCE BY POINTING TO THE FINAL SUCCESS OF  
THE EUROPEAN ONE. THEY WILL BE ABLE TO ARGUE THAT THE  
CHANGED BALANCE OF FORCES IN SOUTHEAST ASIA MAKES AN  
ASIAN CONFERENCE EVEN MORE TIMELY. THEIR BASIC AIMS  
REMAIN UNCHANGED: TO HAVE "THEIR" BANDUNG AND TO TRANSFER  
TERRITORIAL INVIOALABILTIY TO THE CHINESE CONTEXT.  
DESPITE SUCCESSES AT CSCE, THEY WOULD NOT EXPECT  
IMMEDIATE PROGRESS TOWARD CONVENING AND ASIAN CONFERENCE.  
THE IMPORTANT THING FOR THEM IS THAT THEY NOW HAVE A  
NEW IMPETUS FOR TALKING ONE UP, FOR FORCING ASIAN  
COUNTRIES TO DEAL WITH THE ISSUE, AND THUS FOR  
INITIATING A PROCESS WHICH IN ITSELF INCREASES THEIR  
ROLE IN ASIAN POLITICS.

8. INTERNAL EFFECTS OF CSCE: TWO CHEERS FOR BREZHNEV

TO THE EXTENT THAT A CSCE CONCLUSION WILL AFFECT THE  
PRE-PARTY CONGRESS JOCKEYING, IT WILL HELP BREZHNEV'S  
POSITION AND POLICIES. WHILE ACCOMPLISHED JUST IN THE  
NICH OF TIME FOR BREZHNEV'S USE IN CONGRESS PREPARATION,  
THE HELSINKI FINALE WILL ENABLE HIM TO BROADCAST  
THE SUCCESS OF THE OPERATIVE PART OF THE SECOND PLAND  
IN THE PEACE PROGRAM HE OUTLINED FOUR YEARS AGO AT  
THE 24TH CONGRESS: "TO ENSURE THE CONVOCATION  
AND SUCCESS OF AN ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERNECE." THE PRICE  
WE WILL HAVE TO PAY, UNFORESEEN IN 1971, IS A MODEST  
SOVIET OBLIGATION TO PERMIT GREATER EAST-WEST CONTACTS  
AT ALL LEVELS. IT IS AN OBLIGATION WHICH IN THE SHORT  
TERM WILL UNDOUBTEDLY ENHACE THE VOCATION AND  
SUSTENANCE OF SOVIET IDEOLOGUES AND SECURITY ORGANS.

9. WILL THE SOVIETS MEDDLE MORE AFTER CSCE? AN  
UNCOMPLETED CSCE IS UNDOUBTEDLY A RESTRAINING FACTOR ON  
SOVIET EMPTATIONS TO PROBE FOR ADVANTAGES IN TENDER  
SPOTS LIKE PORTUGAL AND THE MIDDLE EAST, AND TO  
EXCERBATE WESTERN ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. WESTERN  
LEVERAGE DERIVING FROM CSCE WILL DIMINISH SHARPLY WITH  
THE SIGNING OF THE HELSINKI DOCUEMNTS. THE WEST  
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WILL RETAIN SOME POST-CSCE LEVERAGE STEMMING FROM THE SOVIET DESIRE FOR ECONOMIC CONTACTS WITH IT, BUT ECONOMIC LEVERAGE IS DIFFICULT TO WIELD (AS THE MFN IMBROGLIO PROVED, IF ANY PROOF WERE NEEDED) AND IN ANY CASE THE SOVIETS PROBABLY BELIEVE THEY CAN AVOID ANY SERIOUS EFFECTS BY PLAYING THEIR WESTERN ECONOMIC PARTNERS OFF AGAINST EACH OTHER. THUS, THE FACT NEEDS TO BE FACED THAT A POST-CSCE CLIMATE WILL GIVE THE SOVIETS MORE SCOPE FOR INTERNATIONAL MEDDLING. OUR PRELIMINARY SPECULATION -- AND WE ADVANCE IT CAUTIOUSLY -- IS THAT THERE WILL STILL PROBABLY BE ENOUGH RESTRAINING FACTORS TO PREVENT A SIGNIFICANTLY MORE VENTURESOME SOVIET POLICY. FOR EXAMPLT, IN THE MIDDLE EAST THE SOVIETS ARE CIRCUMSCRIBED BY THE AREA'S OWN IMPERATIVES AND BY THE DANGERS OF CONFRONTATION WITH THE U.S.; AND ACTIVE SOVIET POLICY OF WEAKENING CAPITALIST ECONOMIES WOULD BE BITING HANDS THAT FEED THEM; AND A COMMUNIST AND SOVIETIZED PORTUGAL COULD SPUR A RIGHTWING SWING IN EUROPE AND GALVANIZE NATO IN THE CENTRAL PART OF THE CONTINENT WHERE SOVIET SECURITY INTERESTS ARE DIRECTLY AFFECTED. MOREOVER, THE SUCCESS OF SOVIET POST-CSCE POLICY WILL DEPEND

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FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9651

INFO AMEMBSSY BELGRADE  
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USMISSION USBERLIN  
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AMEMBASSY LISBON  
AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY MADRID  
AMCONSUL MUNICH  
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AMEMBASSY PARIS  
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IN PART ON THE CONTINUANCE OF A CLIMATE OF GOOD  
FEELING BETWEEN EAST AND WEST. STILL, IT IS NOT  
REASSURING TO READ IN PRAVDA AND IZVESTIYA (REFTEL)  
THAT DETENTE IS NOT INCONSISTENT WITH SOVIET SUPPORT  
FOR THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN PORTUGAL OR IN MEZHDUNARODNAYA  
ZHIZN (NUMBE 4) THAT THE CSCE PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGN  
EQUALITY WORKS AGAINST REPEATED EFFORTS FROM OUTSIDE  
TO IMPEDE THE ESTABLISHMENT AND STRENGTHENING OF  
NEW SOCIALIST STATES.

10. THE PORTUGUESE CONNECTION: SHOULD A CSCE FINALE  
BE DELAYED? WHILE OUR ANALYSIS HAS BEEN PREDICTED  
ON THE ASSUMPTION OF A CSCE SUMMIT IN THE SUMMER, THESE  
ISSUES RAISE THE QUESTION OF WHETHER THE WEST SHOULD  
TRY TO EXTEND ITS LEVERAGE BY DELAYING THE CSCE  
CONCLUSION. THE KEY ISSUE WILL BE PORTUGAL. IF  
PORTUGAL QUICKLY BECAME A COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIP IN  
GROSS VIOLATION OF ITS PEOPLE'S WILL, THEN IN OUR VIEW  
THERE SHOULD BE NO QUESTION OF A CSCE THIRD STAGE IN  
THE SUMMER; INDEED WE ASSUME THE WESTERN EUROPEANS  
WOULD FEEL THIS WAY WHATEVER THE U.S. POSITION.



THE DANGER PORTUGAL HOLDS FOR CSCE IS A CREDIBLE ONE, AND WE BELIEVE THE SOVIETS SHOULD BE REMINDED OF THIS BY THE U.S. AND ITS ALLIES IN A VARIETY OF FORUMS AND ON A VARIETY OF LEVELS. THE POINT SHOULD BE STRESSED TO THEM THAT, WHATEVER THEIR ACTUAL ROLE IN PORTUGAL, THEY COULD NOT AVOID BEING ASSOCIATED WITH AN EXTREME OUTCOME THERE IN WESTERN AND AMERICAN EYES.

1. THE LIMITS OF WESTERN LEVERAGE. IF THE SITUATION IN PORTUGAL FELL SHORT OF THIS "WORST-CASE," HOWEVER, WE WOULD ARGUE AGAINST DELAYING THE CSCE CONCLUSION OR (ASSUMING AN ACCEPTABLE OUTCOME OF STAGE TWO) DOWNGRADING IT FROM SUMMIT LEVEL. EVEN APART FROM THE PROBLEMS A POLICY OF DELAY WOULD PRESUMABLY ENCOUNTER FROM OUR ALLIES, THE EXTENDED LEVERAGE IT WOULD GIVE THE WEST WOULD PROBABLY BE EPHEMERAL. THE ARGUMENT WOULD CERTAINLY BE MADE WITHIN THE SOVIET CONFIDENTIAL

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LEADERSHIP (A LA MFN) THAT RESTRAINT IS NOT WORTH IT, SINCE THE WEST ALWAYS UPS THE ANTE WHATEVER THE SOVIETS DO. NOT ONLY COULD THIS RESULT IN A HARDENING OF THE SOVIET POSITION ON BASKET THREE OR CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES. IT COULD ALSO, BEYOND THE CSCE CONTEXT, STIMULATE EXACTLY WHAT THE WEST WOULD WANT TO AVOID: A SOVIET FEELING THAT THERE IS LESS NEED TO FACTOR PROBABLE WESTERN REACTION INTO THEIR POLICIES IN INTERNATIONAL AREAS OF SENSITIVITY TO THE WEST. WITH THIS IMPORTANT EXCEPTION, WE DOUBT THAT A CSCE COLLAPSE WOULD HAVE ENOUGH IMPORTANCE BY ITSELF TO CAUSE A REVERSAL OF MOSCOW'S DETENTE POLICY, THOUGH IT WOULD CERTAINLY BE VIEWED WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP AS A MAJOR SETBACK FOR THAT POLICY. THERE WOULD PROBABLY STILL BE ENOUGH DETENTE ADVANTAGES FROM MOSCOW'S POINT OF VIEW -- IN THE STRATEGIC FIELD, IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD, INDEED IN PORTUGAL ITSELF AS WELL AS ELSEWHERE -- TO KEEP THE SOVIETS ON THE DETENTE TRACK, THOUGH PERHAPS WITH LESS COMMITMENT TO ELEMENTS OF DETENTE WHICH INTEREST THE WEST.

13. A BALANCE SHEET. TO RETURN, IN CONCLUSION, TO OUR ORIGINAL PREMISE -- THAT CSCE FINISHES SUCCESSFULLY WITH A SUMMER SUMMIT -- WE WOULD EXPECT ITS LONG-TERM EFFECTS TO BE FAIRLY MODEST WITHIN THE OVERALL CONTEXT OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. FROM WHERE WE SIT, WE WOULD DRAW THE BALANCE SHEET APPROXIMATELY AS FOLLOWS: ON THE MINUS SIDE, THE ENDING OF CSCE WILL DIMINISH A SOURCE OF WESTERN LEVERAGE AND GIVE SOME WEIGHT TO THOSE IN THE USSR WHO MIGHT BE INCLINED TO HARRY THE WEST

AT POINTS OF WEAKNESS. IT WILL PROBABLY MAKE LIFE  
ROUGHER, AT LEAST IN THE NEAR TERM, FOR PEOPLE IN THE  
SOVIET UNION AND FOR INDEPENDENT-MINDED POLITICIANS  
AND CITIZENS IN EASTERN EUROP. AND IT WILL PROBABLY  
GIVE IMPETUS TO A NUMBER OF SOVIET INITIATIVES WHICH  
WE COULD DO WITHOUT, FROM ASIAN COLLECTIVE SECURITY TO  
WORLD DISARMAMENT. BUT IT SHOULD ALSO MAKE IT HARDER  
IN THE LONG RUN FOR THE SOVIETS TO JUSTIFY A PRACTICE  
OF LIMITING EAST-WEST CONTACTS TO CAREFULLY MONITORED  
OFFICIAL CHANNELS. IT SHOULD REINFORCE SOME ASPECTS  
OF SOVIET DETENTE POLICY WHICH ARE IMPORTANT TO  
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